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INTERNATIONAL CoNFLicr FOR BEGINNERS. By Roger Fisher. Il-
lustrations by Robert C. Osborn. N.Y.: Harper & Row. 1969 Pp. 
xvii, 231. $5.95. 
This is a peculiar book. Its message is normal enough; the tactics 
of dealing successfully among nations-getting a foreign country to 
go along with most of what you want-do not differ in kind from 
those employed among smaller groups, corporations, or individuals. 
By and large, these tactics consist of putting oneself mentally in the 
other fellow's shoes, and then fashioning proposals which do not 
utterly disregard his interests, while packaging them as attractively 
as possible. If he does not agree with your proposals because the sub-
stance of what he is asked to give is greater than what he will get in 
return, you have at least gotten a bit ahead in public opinion, which 
in long- or short-run terms will be a net advantage at the next 
round. Not a profound message, no doubt, but nonetheless common-
sense, normal behavior on the whole. 
What makes the book peculiar is that its author embroiders this 
message-which, as indicated, most diplomats and other negotiators 
have for a long time known very well and acted upon when they 
could-with breathless examples which indicate that he thinks that 
he is purveying something original or provocative. To compound 
the peculiarity, he provides a concrete application of the desired 
technique to a current international crisis, but his application de-
monstrates that he does not have the foggiest notion how to work 
his own "system." 
Picking the Arab-Israeli dispute as a vehicle ["I devoted a couple 
of days to thinking about Middle East" (p. 203)], Professor Fisher 
drafted a variety of documents designed to demonstrate how to use 
his approach. Piecemeal progress toward an Arab-Israeli settlement 
was in his view desirable, since he was convinced that an over-all 
settlement was not a real possibility. Positioning himself as an ad-
visor to Nasser (not an unnatural position for one who had staked 
out a pro-Arab, anti-Israeli position since at least prior to the June 
1967 war), the author suggests that it would be wise to strive at the 
outset for a "partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai com-
bined with an opening of the Suez Canal" (p. 208). He suggests that 
Nasser open the discussion on this basis by sending a letter to 
U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations. This letter, lest 
we forget, is supposed to present Israel with a "yessable" proposition 
by taking due account of her interests and by being palatably 
packaged. 
Nasser states, in the author's draft letter, that he "accepts" the 
fact that there is a "new state in the Middle East," and that "it is 
called Israel" (p. 212-13). He further "accepts the fact" that Israel's 
international boundaries are no more restrictive than those provided 
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in the 1949 Armistice Agreement, "and no more extensive than those 
of the territory occupied by Israeli forces as of June 4, 1967" (p. 213). 
Israel is thus asked to forgo that portion of the November 1967 Secu-
rity Council resolution calling for recognized and secure boundaries 
-a portion which to her, to the United States, and to the other non-
Arab, non-Soviet-bloc countries, envisaged negotiated territorial ad-
justments in Israel's favor (with respect to the Golan Heights area, 
for example), so that she would not be placed once again in her 
precarious pre-June 6, 1967, situation. 
On the basis of this little blockbuster-or perhaps Israel is not 
supposed to be able to read and understand the words-"as a demon-
stration of our earnest desire to move forward even before Israeli 
troops have been fully withdrawn from our territory" (p. 213), 
Israel is to withdraw forty kilometers from the Suez Canal, so that 
the canal can be opened (for Egypt's revenue and benefit, it may be 
added). Then cargo to and from Israel, but not Israeli ships, will be 
permitted to transit the canal, as before June 1967. 
In short, this "yessable proposition" would restore the pre-June 
6, 1967, situation in all particulars; and in exchange Israel gets 
what? She gets Arab acceptance "as a physical fact [ of] the geograph-
ical existence of the State of Israel and, when it gets back within the 
borders it was respecting [that is, the pre-June 6, 1967, borders], we 
will not use force against it" (p. 214). Nasser, however, would still 
not be "prepared to recognize politically the present Government of 
Israel as a legitimate government, whether judged by its domestic or 
its international behavior" (p. 214), because Israel discriminates 
against Arabs in a manner "just as immoral" as did "pre-war Ger-
many against Jews," and hence is today a Frankenstein creature, un-
willing to abide by international law or the unanimous decisions of 
the Security Council" (p. 215). 
Need more be said about the author's ability to see the other 
fellow's position and fashion proposals attractive to him? Can any-
one really think that Israeli rejection out of hand of such a proposi-
tion would secure it anything but applause from a world public 
opinion with any common sense at all? But no matter; it is clear that 
what we have here must be one large put-on-a huge tongue-in-
cheek. The author must be making an ironic plea for the kind of 
wisdom and judgment which alone can deal meaningfully with 
deep-seated conflicts. What he must be trying to tell us, in an un-
usual display of self-abnegation, is that cute tactical ploys, even 
when they are well-fashioned, cannot begin to cope with real world 
problems. 
The illustrations by Osborn are comical. 
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